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tlbsteac! 
Arompetitive, dynamic mco:lel of Bntey into a new Industry Is set UP and 
both .ts poSitive and ncrmaiive properti1lS aNI sludim The main assumptions are 
. mat uncertainty with r1l$poot to Its evootual size prevails ana that later waves of 
entrants are able to observe hoW profltable earlier entrants had been. The major 
result reported Is thet the equilibrium rate of entry legs behind the optimum one. 
* This paper was completed whlls the &Jthor was visiting the UnivBrsldade Nova 
de UsMa. I ,m grateful to the Luso-American faun'"'t,ons for Development for 
their financial support and to the UNl for thelr hos;Jltallty and tGChnlcai 
lISSislance, both of which had greatly facilitated the CllIllpletion of this manuscript. 
Needless Ic say, responsibilIty for ihe views expressed herein and \heir sclentlflc 
accuracy lies with me. 
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I. Inlrodycl1Qn ' 
When a new market opens (as a result of a prOduct being newly Invented, 
ror instance) or when an exlsti"" market starts to exparKI (due to the discovery of 
. new uses for tne proouot transacted In It), uncertainty regarding Its eventual sIze 
Is likely to prevail and to affect the pace or entry Into It. Surely, firms will not I 
enter Into tho market at once, Instead, some will enter inItially, while others will I
wall and see what the consequences of that early entry had treen, If the merket - In 

relrilSpecl - turns out to be "large", thor early ortran!. seem to have or!ered "at 
 I 
the rIght time". On the other hand, If the reverse Is' true, then those who hed 
, 
waIted seem to nave been "wIse to postpone entry". wnat ootermlnes success In 

such 01 rcumstaoces? 

The purpose of the present paper Is to consioor a sltuatlOli where slJ9C8ss 

Is random or, I n other words, where excessive profits are due to luck. TM basic
, 
tenet of the mOdel below IS tnat no market participant possesses superior 

decision-making capabilities or. superior knowledge, Ex-ante, they all face 

uncertainty 10 making their entry decision. At thet point In time, the timing of 

entry entailS a tradeOff between gaining belter lnformatlon (which the "walt and 

see" strategy delIvers) and realizing large profits (whIch ~~. "Immedlete entry" 

strategy m.1llil1 deliver). Ex -1XlS!, some firms generate higher profits than others 

but thet, ageln, Is attributable 10 luck only and is the Inevitable conseQuence of the 

uncertainty they have Initially faced, The geel of this paper, then, is \0 formalize 

this uncertaInty, analyse the lime-patterns of entry unOOr it and examine their 

welfar-e properties. 

The problem f1f growth and capacity expansion In a new market had 

prwiously been examined by Spen"" [ 1979]. hui his analysis '$ mora pertinent 

to the oligopoly case under certaln\:l. Here we look, Instead, at the woMlon of a 

new IndtJstry under uncertainly ane we do S<l undsr competitive (i.e. free-entry) 

conditions, The focus of tha analys,s Is on the traditional comparison between tr.e 

competitive evolution and the optimal one. This comparison acquires Interest In 

3 
our setting bOClJlJse merkets for fuWre contlnge!lCeS which ar~ written on the SIze 
of the r,ew markel ere (by assumption) non-existent. Relaledly; our setting 
assumes aW/N the posslbmty of con\roots between present and future generatlons 
of entrants. The primary flnolng concerning this welfare comparison It that the 
competitive pace of expansion lags behind the Socially optimal one. this result 
being closely reiatsd to wt'.at K.J. "/TIM [1962] had pointed out more than 25 
years"!ll 10 hiS seminal paper on the Economics of Learning by Doing. 
Our second objective is to expand the literature'on the "Economics of ; 
Learning" to the multi-agent setting. Previous studies on this subject ['J. []. [] • 
. 
[].11ad u$sd a BlJyeslen setting (as we do) end had emphasized the tradeoff ootween 
learning vie experlmentallOn vs. maximizing present PlYYOffs \IlYlm the current 
state of knowledge. More Importanlly, perhaps, their focus had been on the 
implicallons of this tradeoff on the obserV€d ttme-series of agents· actions. While 
valuable. these papers focus on lhe single agent case (mlJll{)poly, tha i)oUsehold: j 
consumer, etc.) ano, as a result, give no consideration to the consequences of ,i 
agents interacting with eactr ot~er (either strategically or via markets). In 
particular, In surn settings it is nol possible to explore the Implications of one ; • 
agent being able to cosllessly learn from another agent's experlllllOO (by observing I 
I 
• 
. the outcome of the latter's action), In contrast. our formulation foouses on the 
multi-agent case ana in doing SO it orlng Into light an externality Which arises 
under those conditions, Broadly speaking, th,is externality is due ID the fact that 
existing firrns ere not rewar!lsd for the informational benefits which their actions I 
confer upon future generations of entrants and, hence, felllD \al:e t~ese benefits 
into llCCllun\ in making their own entry decisions. For this reason, the actual pace I 
of capacity expenslon Is Inefficiently slow, 
The rest of tna paper IS organized as follows. The nexl section sets up the 

male!. The sectIOn following It Introduces the equilibrium roncept, proves Its 

existence and uniqueness and provides two examples Illustrating the results. 

Section 4 sets up the planner's obJect"e function, derives a set of first order 

conditions which are necessary for lis optlrnum. compares them with the 

4 
• 
equilibrium conditions as slated forth In section 3 and completes the parametric 
ex<llnples started mere, Section ~ cont.ms concluding comments, 
I 
, 
• 
I 
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2. Form ulnllon I
•2.11. Conslllll.lll:Jl i, 
The consumption side of the market is ooscribed by astationary (inverse)
. . 
demand function, 
0 <, 
(2.1)P(Q;8)= !1. I 
O,OH I
• 
where 8 c R+. At t-O, e is an unknown parameter. Its prior distribution is 
described by the c.d.1. Fea) with a corresponding pdJ. f(8). The following
, 
restrictions on f are maintained throughout the paper. 
Assumption 11.1.: F.(.) is strictly increastng, continuously 
differentiable and has a finite first moment 
This spaclfication of demand may seem rastrictive, and admIttedly, it is. 
We have borrowed 1\ from the opUmal inventory literature, \his paper being a 
competitive, <!ynamic oontribulioo to It. The major advantage of (21) Is Its 
IrlSeb\lJ\:t: not only with respact to the es\ablisllment of \liner.l existenca and 
uniqueness results (see section 3.A below), but alSO In lerms of computations end 
the ",rivalion 01 closed-form expressions for both the equilibrium and the 
optlmum (see the 8xornplas in sections 3.B end 4.C). On the other nend, the 
centrel Idea whiCh underlies this paper, namely, that potenttal entrants get to 
Ollserve the outcomes of ext,nt firms' actions and hence get to learn from their 
experience, does not seem to hinge upon thIs particular Choice of. parametrIc 
demand function. 
• • 
6 

•
i 
2.11. producers !
,
· I 
Time Is discrete eoo Is Indexed by t~O,1,2,,,, At t=O,.o nrms are 
present in the market end at each subsequent time perlIXJ. Vt new firms enler. The 
, 
act or entry antons an Irreversible Investment, tM per unit cost of which Is e, 
Thus, tM socIal cost . - In terms of perlIXJ t donars .- asSociated with the enlry I 
of VI firms Is 'YI' Firms are non-atomiC and, Ofll.:e entered, are Infinitely l1Ved 
(I.e" each firm'S Investmect Is essumed Jl2! \0 oopreclate). Each firm Is capabte 
of producing one unlt per peflod • at zero variable cost. Letting XI denote the 
number Of existing firms at time t (aller entry In thel perio:! had lalcen piece), l 
we have: 
,/ 
t 
XI = '0 + 2 ,Yo' '0 <0 being Initially given. (2,2) 
;=1' 
,
•, 
By our foregoing assumptions, "t is also the available (and perfectly inelastic) 
· 
supply In the Industry at time \ The proouct martet opens in each and every time 
penod and equilibrium In It IS determlnoo by the stallOWY "'mand, (2.1), and I 
the supply, Xt, More explicitly, I 
= (23)L: I 
Below the entry sequence, (Yt), will be alternatlvaly cooslderoo either as 
market-determined" assuming rree-entry and Imposing azero-profit condition 
.. or as econtrol verlable chosen by a "SOC1.1 plooner", In either case, 6common 
7 

, 
1 . •
! 
diSCOllnt fector, p. -, is assumed The fOIl1lWlngjolnl restriction Is imposed. 
I+r ! 
!
•, 
i 
Msqmplion A,2: c (­

I - P 

I (This assumptlon el1mlnates 1M unlnterestlng possIbility of a degenerate outcome I 
where entry does not occur at all). I
, 
z,e, I nformation and TIme SlryclYJ:I! 
I 
Iootentlal firms (as discussed above there Is an Infinite suppty o(tnem at 
cost c) and the planner are symmetrically Informed. At lhe beginning of lime t, It 
Is publicly kn1lWn whether mera Is still an excess demand In the market, I.e.. 
,
whether 8 , Xt-l or whether the market had alreOOy been saturated, e ~ Xt-l'­ i 
!Within our parametriC example this Informat1on Is revealed by the equl11Drlum , 
price In the product merket at time t-l, I.e., by the relationship (2.3) for t~2. 
for ·\-1 11 Is assumed t~.. t 8 , Xu (and, thus, that FO which is IntroduCed in ! 
section 2.A Is ectually F(.Ia) Xv). For simplicity'S sake, however, we Shall omit I 
an explicit mention of thee}.o condition), , 
Allowing the enlry OOcislon at lime I to depend on the price at I-I, Is 
based on the more !/lneral Idea that prOSptcl1ve entrants ere able 10 obtain 
Information regarding the future profitability of their W!I"t inoustry by re10llng 
financial statements, employment figures and general business news pertaining to 
the firms which are alread;' operating In that Industry. This Information, 
however, is avallaDle only aftor a certain lima lag, and the length of the time Iperiod In the model (1) CiJrresponds exactly to this "observation lag". No ooubt, 
t 
I 
, 
8 

t
opera\l"ll Hrms wHi attempt to COI'lCeal such Information. Howevet. tlWSe ·, 
a!\empts are heHher costless nor are they perfectly successful [ IJ and to the · f 
Sxtent that some Information 00es teaK 04t the features hlOhllghted by thIs' model I 
· 
will be of relevance. I 
I 
i
• 
/ 
/ 
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3. Eguillbrlum 
3.A. Existence ond UnIqueness 
. 
. Heuristically spea<ing, the equilibrium cuncept cunsidered here is one 
where the net (expected) prom available to each entrant at each point In time is 
zer~ M~e precisely, any sequence of investments, Y : (Yt)-I= I. induces ~ 
ranOOm tlme-~tn of prIces, {Pt(e;Y))*t=1 [2]. Furlherm~. glV€1l Ihls 
UmB-palh and lhe information available .1 time t (see I.e obove), • condltlon.1 
dIstrIbutIon of prIces starling as of Ihat date is computable (speclf1cally, the 
Joint distribution of Pt, Pt+ I , ... ) Is welHl3fined once PI' P2 ,... , PI-I ami yare 
known). From this condItional distribution. In turn, one can determine the 
expected dlscountoo ravanue (starting as Of time t) of efirm whiCh sens one unit 
~ 
of the product In. perpetuity. This revenue Is exactly the return which .Hattonal 
entrant (at t) should antICipate on an Investment of c rollers. and -- In 
eQUilIbrium -- the two (I.e.. ,revenue and cost) must be equal. Thus. an 
eQUilibrium Investment path. (Yt)"t= I Is o:1e lor whicl1 the property 0( 
oost:axpected dlscoonted revenue hOlds at each and every point In time.
. . 
Notatlonclly. given y. (Yt)-!;I and the corresponding x • (Xt)-t=O 
(sea (2.2». we first defme: 
.. Pr(1 >'t.n) 
Ilt,n" Z PU'Pr(e>X!+nll>xt-I)= (3.2) 
k~n+ 1 Pr(1 >Xt-I) 
10 
_ IH Irt = ~ Pt.k (~ pn). t = 1,2.... ;k = 0,) .2.... (3.3) k=O n=O 
(P!,k IS the probability that Coollars tnvaste(l at tlma t will yIeld a poslttve I
return for exactly <perloes; '1t.n is the probability \hat they will yield a posillve 
return for at Je!iSI n+ I perJOOs; rt Is th. lif.II':. revenu. which this i.weslment 
Is expacted 10 generate). 
... k-1 ... ... .. I
MQIE: rl' 2: Pt•• (2: PO) = l: pO( ~ PU) - 2: pn<lt.o. (3.4) 
.-0 n-O n-O "n+ 1 n=O I 

Next we Introduce: I 

. . 
DEFINIIIO~: Aperfect (oreslgnl. free entry equilibrium (DEFEE) is a_nee of 
, 
Investments. (Yt). for which the Induced probabilities. (Pt.k). are $lJoolhat 
c=rt. t .... i.2,... (3.5) i 
t 

liQll; Since thert's depend on the vector of capacity lavels. (Xt). coMttlon (3.4) 
oofines an Infinite system of (non-linear) equaUoflS in an Infinite number of 
"unknowns", (Xt)*t=I' Theorem 1 below astobHshas that a simple and unique 
solution to it exists and that it can be determined retursjveJy. 
THEOREM J: Under assumption (A.1 l. a unique PFFEE exists and It can be 
cie1ermtned serially from following set of conditions: 
I 

I 
! 
i 
(3.0) 

Iilill;. The RHS of (3.6) is the expected dIscounted revenue which Is ""enoble to • 
firm entering at the beglnlng of ttme t, and 11 OOpendS on the endoget\eous CIlte. 
---
I 
, 

11 
; 
PBOOE' We start out by provIng apair of clolms.. 
(37) 
PROOf: 'It+I,n-I'-----.· , 
. Pr(8)Xt)lPr(8>Xt_l) 
(see exprll$Sion (3,2»,
\0 
(3.8) 
•,
- - I
•
pROOf: rt" 2: pn qt.n • 'It,o + I pn Cit.n 
n·O n=1 I, 
-
"111,0 +H pn-1 Cit,Q Cit+ 1,n- \ "!it,o + !it,o p I po Cit+ I.n I
n=1 n-O 
I
where the first equality Is based on expression (3.4) and the thIrd one on claIm t : 
(thot Is, on (3 7)), 
. 

ReturnIng now to the proof of the theorem, it is clear from the WIN the 

12 

\ 
! 

I • model had been set u~ that 'It.O = H(Xtl& ) Xt- 0 (see exp~esslOO (3.2». Thus, 
substituting c (instead of rt ond rt.1 ) Into (3.8) we get 
(3.6) 
Obviously, given an 't-I thlsequahon has6~$()lulion, Vt (here the 
strict monotonlcity of FIs being used), aoo our proof is completa 
3.B. IIllllllr1lllye Examples 
1. (Uniform) Specializing Ihe fundamenllIl zero- profit coodilion (3.6) to 
lhe case where F(e) 0 e. 0 a ~ 1end assuming '0 0 0 we have, / 
0-­ (3.9) ,
• 
I-'t-I I'pc 
. From lhis we readily obtai n: 
HH)c '. 
YI" (1-xt_I)"'(!-xt_I)· ..U-..)t-l. (3.10a) 
. l'Pc 
(3. lOb) 
end 
(3.IOc) 
The! Is. in the unIform case the equilibrium IS SUCh IMt the tth perIod 
Investment Is equal to a corslant frocHon, .. (whiCh by assumption A2 Is strictly 
13 

!between zero and one), ofthe maximum residual market, l-xl_.,' I 
. I 
Thus, the sequence of investment. forms.a geometric series with a first 
term = .. ar;j a decay rate = 1-~. Furthermor~, from the definition 'of" (see 
(3.10"ll we sse - os one would have expected.- that investments are I 
t, 
monotonically Increasing In, (the tltscounl factor) arn!OOcreasing In (l 
i 
2, (Exponential) Specializing (3.6) ogoin to the case where 
and assuming '0 = 0, we have 
/ 
rhus: 
I 1+pc 
Yt=-log(-hy8 (3.130) 
r.. c 
(. constant), 
and 
t 1+'c)
Xt=y8t=-log(. ) (3.13b) 
r.. c 
(a constant investment path makes sense here since the oondltfon 8 >z affects \lTe 
exponential denslty by shifting 1\ 2 UnTts to the right, leaving its shape 
unchanged). 
I 

(3,12) I
I 
! 
r 
I 

• 
• 
, 
i 
I 
14 . ,I 
t 
In terms or comparative statics, (3,12) shows that hwestmSnts are 
decreasing In /. (the dlstrlbutlons F(.jI» are stoohosll~lIy GrOOrad by /., alarger 
1 corresponding 10 a smaller dlstrlbutiOQ); l1Kewlsa. 'I Is OOcreaslng In cand Is 
increasing in~, 
, 
For both examples 1and 2, the impl1ed time-patterns Of.Investments are 
'. . 
norHncreasing (I.e" YI L Yt+ I ' t ~ 1). This property holds, more generally,. 
undOr the following (sufficient) ooOOilion, 
H(.) , 
PROPOSITION I: Assume the hazard ratio is (strictly) OOcreaslng. Than 
f(,) 
tha aqullibrlum Investment sequence, (Yt)-t= 1, Is (strictly) OOcreaslng. 
f(e'z)-F(z)' " 
PROOf; Note that the family of distributions, ( . lnO' Is I 
. , I-Hz) I 
,stochesti~lly decrees.lng in z, 
• 
& F(t+z)-F(z) 
- ( J= 
8z I-Hz) I 
[f(e+zH(z)][ H(z)].f(z)[F( .+z)-F(z)] I 
= 
I 

[H(z)] 2 
f(8+2)[ I-F(z)H(z)[ I-Fe a+zll 
= )0,
[ H(zl)2 
1-f() 
where the lasl1naquality follows from the monolonicity of-­
f(.) 
• 
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I 
, 

I, 

The proposition rlNI follows immediately. I( we r""!'rite the equilibrium 
ooridltion, (3.6), esc 
-------; <1, 

I • po . 

Auseful implication of the above proof Is stated in the next corollary. W. 
shall have an w"eslon to apply It In tho next sootlon. 
COROlLARY I; Under the condition stated In ProposItion I, 
- 8(8+2) _ 

f <IJ <f 81(8)08, Z. R•. 

o I-F(zl 0 
,/ 
/ I! 
l 
t 
t
• 
I 

: 
! 
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1. Qptlmum 	 I 
!loA. Derlylng the Conditions of Qptlmallty 
Our approach here Is 10 sal-up the periOd one.5OOlal objecl1ve, expressing 
1\ as afunction of the >lQfj;, varia~les (XI 'X2"..) (rather Ihan thefm!. variables. 
(YI 'Y2.·..) and deme from it the first-order conditions which are necessary, I 
for an oplimum. In the appendix we Du\ling the more Indirect. dynamic 
programming apprOllCh. Obviously, the two epprOllChas yield the sa!lle set of 
optimality condll1ons.. 
Cooslder, then. an Investment plan. (Yn)-n= 1. and its associated total 	 i 
I 
o 
capoolty sequance. {xn)-n= 1 (whare, as before. Xn"Xo +~ YI)' For h( Xn,xrft 11 •
., 
1-1 / 
,
It follows from our Informational 	 assumptions (see Section LCabove) thai 
. '. 
Investments lake place for the first Ot I periods and Ihat they cease Immediately I 
after YOt 1 had occured AI thaI point In time It becomes Known that productive I 
Capacity. xn+1 •exceeds the ilC1Ul!l demand - e and. as capHal 00ss oot depreciate. 
further Investments (at thaI point) would De SOCially wasteful. Thus, the r!l!lIlZlii I 
Investment path which arises when e. (xn,xD+Ills (y I"" 'Yn+ 1,0,0".. ) end tile 
Iotel cost associated with it (expressed In terms of period I oollars) is: 
I 

(4.0 
Turning to consumers' benefits we note that they ere constrained by tile 
avallable proouctlve capaclly during the 'growth phase" (I.e., aur1ng periods 
1,2.... ,n) end ere fully satisfied there,fter [31 (wring the "mature phase"). In 
other words. consumers' stream of benetlts IS of the form (x I.x2.....xn .... ' ...) 
I17 ! 
! 
whICh, condItional on 80 (xn'xn• I] has an expected diScounted va!ua of: 
n Xn.l 9 
:l: ,1-1'1 + pn 1 - f(8) 0). ( 4.2) 
1=1 f(xn+l)-F(xn) xn . 1-, I 
TI)YS, combInIng (4.1) aM (4.2) aM takIng the expectro value uOOlr the prIor, 

10, we gat a00 SOCIal oeneflt 01 
 I 
I 
- x".l n+1 n 8 I 
I.{j [-c I phlYt+I pI-I 'I +,n_] I(eldej = 
n=O xn I~I i-I 1-, I 
I 
• n+ 1 n xnt 1•• 
/ 
.' 
- Z ( -c I pl-I YI + :l: pi~ lxl)[F(xn+ 1 )-F( x n)] + pn 1 -(elde). . (4.3) I ,, 
n=O 1=1 1=1" xn 1.1-, , , 
I
. 
. 
Next, setting Yi=xi-xi-I and manipulating the resulting exp~ion (see 
the appendIx 'for lUll details) we get 
.. 'Xn+ I • 
W(.)ac,o+! pn[xn+l(l+~)[H(xn+l)]-c[l-F(xn)Jl + I· -f(elde] 
0=0 xn 1-, 
(4.4) 
(4.4) Is tha soola1 objeclfve funclfon, 800 we first prwe that. maximum to It 
exists 

H(e) 
THEOREM 2: Assume the hazard ratio, , Is decraasmg in e. Then 
1(8) 
W(x) allainsa maximum, x*, which satisfies lhe property 'n*l oM, where 
M. ' 
i 
18 j 
f efIeldS, I 
!, 
£BOOf; The propesHlon Is proven in two steps, 
. ' 
CLAIM 1: An InVestment plan, (Yo)o.' ' Is ll!Il. optimal unless Yn,M lor ali" n~ 1. 
£BOOf; Starting from any xn-I and assuDllnge)Xn_I' constJmers' fl~H of beneflts 
• e 
cannot exceed 1 - f(ele, xn-l)de (which Is what afully loformed planner 
, '0_1 1-_ 
would attain by cllooslng Yn - e-xn_I)' But, 
• 8 Xn-1 _ .. 8-Xn_l ' 
J -f(ele >'n-l)de ---I f(ele>xn_r)de= ~ I 
l 
Io \-p \-p 0 l-P / 
'0-1 • 9f(8''-0_1) Xn-l ., 
.--+ 1 <I!<-'-+,cM. 
H 0 (l-P)[H(xO_\)] l-P ! 
• 
wher9 \he above inequality follows from \he corollary following proposltioo I (In 
section 3), Thus. If Yo>M the continuation Vlll"" of (4.4) WOUld be below 
xo-I xn- \ 

-and this Is Impossible sInce --Isattainable by choosln<J Vt =O,t 2 n. 

I~ l~ 
The Importance of Claim 2 Is \hat It allows us to see!: an optimum to W(x) over 
the restricted setA. where 
l, 
By Tychoroff theorem AIS compact In the product t~lC'JY, Thus, It romain to 
show 
I 
19 

ICLAIt! 2; The functional r4A) Is continuous onA, where AIs 8noowed with the 
product IDpoIOi!Y. 
• 
ffiQQf': Rewrite ( 4.4) as W( x) =exc + 2: ,n u( xn ,xl\+ I ), 
n=O 
where I 
t e 
u(Z,2')· t((l+,C)[I-F(t)J-c[H(z)])+J -f(e)de, 
z 1-, I 
! 
,
ond note thaI, by assumption A.I , u Is 6continuous ood bounOOd function on R2. 

Hence, glvan an • ) 0, an N(.) can be found for WhIch i 
I 
/ I
-2: pnlu(xn,xn'l) - u(x'n,x'n' 1)1 <0/2, for all x,x'. A, 

n=Nr.)·1 
 t 
i,let •• A be glveo and let x denote Its projection on RN(.) (I.e.. xl=xl, 
\: \ ",. ,N(c)). Then by tho continuIty of uC,,), AneighbOurhood. O(o,x)s;. RN(t) , 
of x exists for which 
Max I V(Xn'Xn.' )-u( x' n,x' n.I)1 (t/2N(.),x' .O(o,x), : 
Bn>N(.) IThus. for any x'. 0(.). Ix'. Alx'. O(,.x)} we have j 
N(.) • IIW( xl-we .')1< :l: '"lu(xn"n+1 )-u(x' n,x'n+lll+ :l: POlu('n'xn• 1)-u(.' n.x'n.l )1<., 
n- 1 n=N(.)+ 1 I 
I 
, 
20 
! 
I 
And oor olalm IS proven. 
Th",rem 2 validates adifferentlal apprm to Ihe maximization of (4.4), 
and we proceed to the derivelion of itsfirst-OfOOr' conditions, Dlfferentiatmg 
(4.4) with respect to Xt we gat: " I 
I j 
I 
Finally, from (4.5), after division by pI-I [·I-F(Xt-I)1. the following 
proposition Is deriVed, ITHEOREM 3: The planner's first-oroor optimality condItions are given by 
C=(.I+PO)[H(Xtls>Xt_IJ] + payt.1 f(xtlS>Xt_IJ, 1=1,2".. ,(4.6) 
,
/ 
.. ' \ 
leI us pose here for a moment and give these conditions an economiG 
Interpretation os a set of marginal equlvalencas. On the LHS of (4.6) we clearly I 
. . • 
have the cost associated with the entry of one extra firm at 11m. t On the RHS, tile 
benefit is two- fold, First, thSl'1l is the dirool benefit which Is due to the fact that 
produc!lve capacity - and alonQ with it oonsvmp\lon - Is Increasalos a result of ! I
this Investment act, The value which the product merket attaches \0 this tleooflt Is I 
I 
exactly equal to the flrst term on the RHS - os the pr-oof of thooi"llm 1 llbov£ 
ShOWs. Second, there Is the lD(ormIDlllll~1 benefit which Is due to the potential 
av<Jidance ofth, wasteful investment. VI. I' This investmeni Is WllS\eful 'llheoover 
•• [Xt,Xt + A) (A being an "Infinitesimal'), and It ISl!V()lded since the Incipient 
firm lowers tM period t price from 1 to O. slgnal11ng thereby the 
"unwarraniedness" of Yt + I (recall thai period t price becomes known at i+ 1 and 
that Pi • 0 Signifies the end orthe growih era), Observe \hath [Xt,Xt+A) occurs 
• 
• 
21 
with probabili\y t( Xtle ) xI-I) and lhat the amount of money,( In terms of P\lt\1XI 
t dollars) soved in that event is pc Vt+ I' Hence. the second term on the RHS of 
(4.6) Is Inoeed the (expecIOO) Informational value Of the Incipient firm's entry 
'In period t 
., 
1,B,l:llmp8ring Ihg Optimum with tho Equilibrium 
The discrepancY between the flrst-Wder optlmallty conditions. (4.6). 

and the PFFEE conditions. (3.6). Is now revealoo. Clearly, the Informmiooai 

~ of the entry act. I.e., the second term on the RHS of (4.6). Is not taKen Into 

account in a frea-market setting. Hence, private investments are reduced and the 

productive cepectty which is ectuellv aval1abl. In the industry at eech .palnt in 

,
time' Is below tl1ilt which would haVe prevailed under the soot"1 optimum, More ·• 
formally. we heva ,
• 
. 
II!EQREM 4: The oplimum sequence of productive cepacity levels, ('to)~t'O,.ls I
• 
. larger, term by term. than the equilibrium sequence, (Xte)-t=O' 
l:&QQf.; We proceed by IndUctl00. For toO we· certainly have Xto·'le. Assume n(fll 
that XtO ~ 'Ie for some t) 0 and suppose. per absurdum. that Xt+ 1° <Xt+ Ie, Than I 
we must hava 
i 

I 

! 

using the strict mcnotonlcitv of Fand thelnduc!lve hypothesis. 
But then, by (3.6) and (4.6). respoo\lvely: 
22 

I 
I 
I 
This establlshes the sought after contradiction. Thus, Xt+ 10 I xt+ Ie and 
the theorem Is proven. 
1,e. EXlIIDPles 
\
• 
Vnlih the equilibrium (see (3.6», the optimality condlt1ons, (4.6). are 
, . 
ru:1 serially solvable starting (rom some Inttlel coMlt100, XO' The reason Is that 
(4.6) defines a SllC!)nd-Qrdllr difference equation aM, thus, obtaining a spaclf1C 
solullon to 11 requires that this solution's value - at l.I!ll dlslloo\ points - be 
specified When the support of FIs bounded, a second boul'lllary condlllon Is x_ ~i, 
. where ii Is the supremum of this support. (The appendix furniShes a rlilJ!'ous 
jusllflcalion for this boundary condition) otherwise. one has to select (by 
"Inspection") among the solutions to (4,6)'on8 which is ectually an optimum, 
These two approaches are (respectively) Illustrated In the two examples below. 
Il Xo ; 0 and F Is uniform on [0.1l. In that case the first-order 
cendltlOll$, (4.6), specialize to: 
1 
0: (! +Jc) + ~Xt+ I - Xt)-'--­
l-x\-1 1-x\-1 
I 
I 
iI ; 
23 
or. after multiplying by I-x\-I and rearranging. 
Which is. second-order linear difference equation with CQIlStont ooefficients (see 
GOldberg [ 1), Apartlculor solution to 1\ Is: I 

I( 4,80) 
-I +J! +'ijlc(1-c+(IC) 

Wilere y ~ ( 4,8b) 

. . I 
t 
I 
I 
/' 
., Thts soMl00 Is obtained by oostula1ing Its form (whiCh. "In turn,ls 
motivated by the equilibriun) soluticn. (3, I 0)) and then solving the quadratic
, 
I 
~ 
equation, 
( 4,&) 
I 
I 
which resulls when we subsUtute (4,86) Into (4.7). By our maintained 

assumption. (A.2), only the larger of the two roots of (4.&) (I.e,. (4.8b» Is 

economically sensible, that Is, ~ • (0,1), While other solutions to (4.7) do exls\ 

(and are of the form Xt+kIXt( l)+k2Xt(2). where K1 and KZ are arbitrary 

coosla"ts and Xt(1l = (ml)t (1=1.2). m1 and m2 baing the 'roots of the 

cher;,:taristic equation pcm2-( I+2Pc)m+o=O). lflgy 00 not satisfy the pair of 

boundary coodiuons Xo·O.x_~l - unless ~1=k2'O, Thus, we conclude that 

(4,80) Is. in fact. the Jl!limJll maximizer of expression (4.4), From (4,80), it is 

easy to show now lhet 

( 4,8d) 
•• 
· . 24 

( 4.86) 

Tberefore, both the Investment policy function 00d the OIlservOO time 
series of capooity levels are of the same form as those which emerge In 
equllibrium. The only difference is that, ) .. (which follows from (~.2» end, 
thus, as theorem 4 asserts XtO2 Xt" for w;h end fNery 1. 
Using equation (4.8cl, which ~mines " we can also establ1sh 
comparative statips results analO\Jlus to those establ1shed in section 3.6,1. We 
heY. 
-
,/ 
/ 
<ty c( 1-,2)
,-, ) 0 , (4.9lI) . 
If 1+2110, 
, 
and 
I-P( 1-,2)~ 
-=- <0 ( 4.9b) 
ac 1+2110, 
FInally, (urtller calculatioos show that the 8ellman equation (sao the 
appendix) is $<lIved by a linear (uneUon 
H 1-,}2_2( Hlc, 
Vo < (4,108) 
2( l-PJ[ I-p(J -,}2] 
25 

and .. 
 I 
·(4.IOb) 
-
TM result Of numerical calcUlal10ns for me !lI1~nous variables 
(.,~ ,va,v I) given the values of the exagenoos dot. over e grid In the ("c) plane 
Is reported In TebleI below. 
I 
l 
i 
/ 
I, 
\ 
I
•I 
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. 
I,
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4 60.5 I 2· i 
I 
, 
, 
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: 0.96 
, i, 
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, , 0.95 , 
,, 
0.90 
,
, 
, 
.0.80 
, 
0.50 1 
, 
Values y -Val...(l ­
~ : 6, 
1 0.98 
, 
I , 
, 
0.95 
. 
, 
0.90 
, 
M I ' 
, 
, 
, 
2 I 4 
, 
, 
. 
6 
, 
I 
1';\ 
0,98 
0.95 
0.90 
, 
0.5 
, 
, 
I 2. 
. 
, , 
4/; 6 
• 
, 
, 
, 0.80 
, 
0.60 
0.50 0.50 . , 
, 
v - V.I"", V, -V.I .... 
o 
TABLE 1 
2) "0 = 0 end F is exponential wllh parameter '->0, I.e. F(a) = !-a-M. 
In that case the first-order oonditions reduce to: 
1 
I
•
i 

I 

27 

(4.11) 
, 

Defining: 	 , 
j
, 
( 412) 
• 
we can express (4.11) more concisely Il$ 
.,(Yt.Yl-l) =c, t =. 1,2....... / (4.13) 
. \ 
Implicitly differentiating the curve .,( y ,i)=c. we nole thot along it one must Ihave: 	 • 
<It' Vfy 1 

-=--= I --+:\.y" I +-.0' I (4.14) 

<It Vfy' pc pc 
 I 
Thus, three types of solutions to the <It_Ie-system (4.13) exist 
(consult Figure 1 below). 
• 
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Iy' I 
, 
I 
y 
~ (y.y')=C 
/ 
FIGURE I 
(I) Aronstont time-path Yt. '1'. where Y' is sooI1 that ,,('1'.'1')'0: i 
Note thet the func\lon t(y) • "(Y.Y) is strictlY diminishing In Y. that . I 
t( 0): I+pc>c (by 6SSlJmptlon (A.2» end Illat I 
11m t(y)=O. Thus. a~'I'as abo'lsexl.sts. 
V­ I
, 
(11) A time-path YI whlcll monotonically diverges to infinity at a 
sUPBf9JOflletrlc rate. I.e" one for which YI ) Y' aM Yt+ 1 ~ gt YI' where 9 Is 
ooflned In (4.14) (by (4.14) and (j!;Ure I. Yt. I-Yt i g(YCYt-l) from whiCh 
this lime pattern follows). 
(ill) An investment path which monotonically OOcl1nes \0 zero In (jnlla 
time. I.e.• One for which YI <'I' andy! =0 for all t i some T. 
·1 
29 I 
,I 
, 
. 
in the appendix we show tl1m neither (jj) ncr (lH).constitutes OIl 
optimum, which leaves us with (I) as the unique maximizer Of (4.4), Therefore, 
we hev", 
. , 
(4.ISa) I 
! 
wher.yO IS the (unique) soiulion of .-).Y[ I+1IC+P~yl:c 8Ild. I 
. (4.18b) 
which, as In the unUorm example. has the same focIll as !heeQU1I1brlum sequenca 
Furthermore, OM coo show that yO ~ yO which conforms. of OOUN;S, with the 
general assertion conlained in theorem 4. / 
/ 
Regarding comparative "\elIO$ results we can Implicitly differentiate the 
eQUetlont(y;p,c}.)' -.(y,y;p,c}.)·c which yields: 
-:-->0, (4.19a) 
I 
IJy'J J( 1+).y) I 
-.- <0, (4.19b) 
<Ie I+_~y 
and 
IJy'J 
---y<O. (4.19c) 
~ 
! 
«4.19c) makes sense since a larger" means 6less favorable - In the first order 
stochastic dominance sense - distribution and thus smaller investments) I 
,I 
• 

. 30 
finally. as In the uniform Cf!Se. the value function for the exponenl1al 
prC\lrem turns outto be linear. V( x) = Vo + vlx. with 
vo·------ (4.200) 
I 

!, 
i 
( 4.20b) 
I 
. / 
I
, 
Teblell b.low reporls the values of the endogenOus variables 1';".voand 
v 1 for. grid ofP.c values. .. 
r 
• 
I• 
I 
I 
,. 
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I 
,
• 
v - Value:5 v 1 - V.I"",
o 
TABLE 2 
i 

I
•
, 

,• 
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Ii. Summary ond Conc)uslons 
This paper coosloors the compelltlve e';olut1on of a new mar~el under 
uncertainty, The sffoots of uncertainty on entry, In'O mlil< model hlld previously 
been exami..., by [ ], whereas sequential entry ~na,r certaJotv Mel been 
considered by [ I. [ j, Here the main preml5llis that jlfltry occurs In waves. and 
the! later entrants get to observe how succassful ear her entrants had been and ere 
OOle'\o act upon that Information, Our primary c0r01lJS1on una,r those conditions 
is \hill a divergence between \he optimum end \he equilibrium arises, which is 
Similar In spIrit to what the research end davelopment literature had pOinted out, 
In our oottlng, Informational spillovers occur because the signalling content of 
entry (from which latar entrants _It) (pOS unrewarded, Hence, the ~ual rate 
of entry Is lnelflclently low, The viability of corr~lve maasures (such os 
g:lveromental subsidies or collat)oratlon among prospective entrants) remalllS the 
subject of future research, / 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 
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NQlES 
[IJ If for no other reason ti1ey require COOj>eretion amono operatll1\l fIrms, and 
those are assumed to compate with eacIl other. 
[2J Because of the special demarul function, (2.]), we have postulated, the form of 
. this lime-path IS very simple: prices ere first equal to unity; then they drop 
to zero end remain ti1ere forev.... From the perspective of time zero, then, the 
randomness which is embeOOed In this lime-path is simply a matt... of_ 
wHl the drop In prIces occur for the first time. 
[3] To elaborote: there is en excess demarul in the Industry duril1\l the growth I
.
phase, tI1at islosey,8>xl for j=1 ,... ,n end en excess supply, i.e.,8, 'n.I' 
I 
,
thereafter. 
I, 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX 
I, The following lemma 15 oe€<lld both for the derivotion of (4.4) m the 
text and for the boundary coodltlon ,_ • i, Imposed In section 4.C.1. 
LEMMI! D, I: Under assumptions A, t and A.2. the opt"nal sequence of 
. close to xthis inequality holds), Then as n ... _, we have 
I-F(x'le >x) 

Zen) .(x'-X) - c(x'-x) ..... o
1-, 
Where 
H(x'le> ill 
00. (x'-xl - c(x'-xl) 0 1-, 
(This exploits the continuity of F(.P In lis second variable, which follows from 
assumption A. j) 
capacity levels, (Xo)"o=l. converges to i (i being the supremum of the 
dls.trtbutloo F). 
I!ROOE: xn Is increasing ana, thus convergent (pOSSibly til 1nfl~tty). 
,/Assume, cootrary til our claim. that xn.... x' i. Let x' , xbe such that .. 
I-F(x'ls>x) \ 1 )c (-) C, tr{ A.2, Thus, tr{ A.I , for x' sufflctontly1-, ,I-P I
• 
I 

I 

A2 

Pick OfJII an Inleger Nfor which 
IlI1d consider the follfJIIlng olternollve Investmenl policy, (Yt)-I=I' 
I I! NVI x'-xH 1=1'1+1 o t L 1'1+2 
Denote the v.lue of this policy at xN (te , when x • xN end it Is known lhala>'N) 
by uA and denote the value of iheorlglnal policy at lhe same state by '\r Th~n we 
have: ,/ 
X a _ ~ 

"0'[ -f(ale >Xl'll de + -[I-f(;:I" ,,,,l] , 

xN I-P 1-, 

. and 
• a x' a x' 
u... =J -f(818 'XN) !II + f -f(ala >'Nl!ll + -[H(x'te>XNll 

xN H i1. I-P H 

f 
t 

I 

I 

! 

i a x 
-c(x'-xNh f - f(ala >xN) <II + -[F(x'ie >Xl'll - F(xla >xNll 
xN 1-, l-p' 
x' 
+ -[H(x'ia >xl'll1 - c(x'-x) - c(x-xN)1-, I,
, 
, 
A.3 

, 
I
• 

• 

I 

1 
I 

I 

j 
I 

I 

Thus. 
, ­). -x 
uA - Uo ~ - [I-f(x'ie >xNl] - c(x'-x) - c(x-xN).1-, 
Therefore. at x~'N the original polley IS dOminated by the elJernatiWl, 
~ . (YI)' which ccnlradlclS the former's presumed optlm811ly. The proof IS nrNi 
complete. 
2. DerlvJI1\l8xpre$~mm (4,4)from (43). 
,/ 
'n+1 8 
The last term.pn [ -'-.f(8)de, inside the br!l:eS of(4.3) and (4.4) Is 
xn 1-, 
Identical. Thus, It remains to deal with the terms prOOOOlng It. 
Note. first, tMt 
n+1 n+1 n 
I pl-IYI = :1:pJ-1(Xj-XI_l 1= -xo + pn xn+ 1 + (1-PH pH xI' 
1 I 1 
Thus, 
0+ 1 n+ 1 n 
-c L ,1-1 YI + L pi-! XI • ( 1 +pc-c)(:1: pl- I xi) • Cl<o - cpn xn+ I . 
1 1 I 
Next, 
----~.--- ----.,~--... ." -.~--~------- -------~--.---
A4 

I 

where the first equality follows from a change in the ordlr of summation end the 
seconOfrom lemma B, I (according to which F(x.)= I), ~ I 
/ 
/ 
Therefore, 
- n , 
! [( I +Pc-c)! pi-I Xi+cxo-cjIOxn+ I][F(xn+I )-F(xn)] t
n=O i= I ; 
I 

I 

I 

I 

• n , 

I (! ,I-I xl)[F(x + I) - F(x;.,)) = 
n
n=O 1= I 
- - ,-
= ! ,i-I xii I [F( xn+ I ) - F(x )) =! ,1-1 Xj[1-F(xl))n

1= I n=1 1= 1 

= ! pOxn+ I[ H(xn.,)]. 
1=0 
.. 
-exo+! ( I +,c-c) ,Oxn+ I[ H(xn+ I)]-cpllx +I[F(xn+ I )-F(x )])n n
n=O 
-
= CXo+ ! pOxn+ I {( I +PC)[ I-F(x + I »)-c[ H(x )]},n n
n=O 
which corresponds to the nrst two terms in expression (1.4). OUr dltlvation Is 
now comp lele. 
AS 
 I 

3. The dynamic prO<jremmlng approach 
. 
.The 5ellman llQUal1011 corresponding to the planner's program may be 
wrllten as 
x+y e . • 
Vlx)=Mex (-CY.+ J - f(ela>x)dt+[x+y+pv(x'y)][ !-F(x+VI8>x)Jl (5 1 ) 
y,Q x I-P 
tHEOREM 5: Assume F has acompacl support Then lh1ire exiSts aunique and 
continuous $Olul1on to the Bellman equation. 
I ('Roof: Consider the Banach space of continuous functioos. C. on the support of F. 
!OgeItler with the sup-oorm on 11. The RHS or IS, I) 03f1nes a mappmg, T, 011 thaiI I
space. we sl10w thai II Is a contraction map and that lhe Image of a oontlnuous 
function undar It Is continuous as well. This, by Ihe Banach fixed point theorem,
. / 
is .lllholls needArl. I 
let then V. C. By o~r ~elntajned assumption, A.I. the·RHS of (S. I) is 
conttnuous In the pair (x ,y). Thus, amaximum to It exi"ts. and by the theorem 01 
.Ihe maximum (see Berge [ I. p. ) the maxlmlZlld value Is contlnuous In x. This 
establishes thai TIs InOOed lIll!! C. 
Nexl, for any V. Clet H(y;x,V) be the RHS maxlmend end lei h(x.V) be 
Ihe corresponding maximizer (which, as we have jus! shown, ®as exist). leI V, 
~ 
V.c be given. Then: I 

ITV(xHV(x)I' IH(h(x,V):x,V) - H(h(x,V):x,V)1 • 
~ -
• H(h(x,V);x,V) - H(h(x,V):x,V), 
I 
assuming without loss of generality thet Iheleft hend term is larger than the right 
hand one. I 

i 
I 
A.6 

f 

Cgnl!nulng, 
'" ~ ~ ~ H(h(x,V);x,V) - H(h(x,V);x,V) 
~ 
=[X'y.PV(X'y))[ I-F(x'yle>, ll-[x.v"V(x'Y)][ I-F(x'yle>,)] 
~ ~ 
-,[V(x+y)-V(X+y))[ H(x'vle>x)] ~ ~lIv-vlI, 
wheN; y = h(x,V), Thus, T is a cootrec!ion with mooulus, and our claim Is 
proven. 
From this point on we shell proceed unoor the further assumption that V 
is, In fact, gll!l!renU~ilJ~. This is m1 guaranteed by theorem 5, but holds, for 
Instance, if one further restriction is imposed on the exogenous data. Namely, thai 
the )erms Insloo the braces of (4.4) are concave (see Benveniste aM SchSmkmen 
[ 1, p. ), Differentiating tna RHS of (5, I ) the following flrs\-oroor oonaition Is 
, 
obtained, 
x+y 
.0 = [I +PV'(x'y)J[ I-F(x+vI8>x)]-pf(x+YI8>x)[V(Xty)- - j, (5,2) 
1-1 
Furthermore, by the envelope theorem, 
fIx)' .+y 8 x 
V'(x)-c' (I -f(6pI;x)d8--+[X'Y"V(x+y)][ I-f(,'yle>,)]) 
H(x) x I-P 1-, 
f(x) x 
- at [V(x)+cy--J. (5,3) , 
H(x) 1-, 
using equalion (5, I ) to eilminet6 the term [x+y.pV(x+ylJ( I-F(x'yle,.)], 
Evelucling now (5,3) at x+'1 ( Instead of x) end using the "","lIing expression to 
A,7 

x+y 
elimInate [V( x+y) - -J from (5.2) (the last lerm on Its RHS), we obtaIn:1-, 
c = (I +~c)[ l-f(x+vi8>x)J + Pcv'f(x+yI8>x) 	 . (SA) 
(where Y Is \l1e max1m1zer of \l1e RHS of (5, I 1for next period's slate. 1.8., for 
x'=~+yl. ThIs coincioos with (4.6) (setting x=Xt-1' Y=Yt aruly'=Yt+ 1) end our 
derivatIons are complete. 
4. 	ProvIng the optimality of a constant Investment path. Yt"" for the 
exponential case (section 4.C.2J. 
The following prelimirwy result is needed: 
/ 
i 
LEMMA 6.2: Given an existing ~aclty level of Xo and the informalion that 8>x •o
the continuation value of the planner's program under the axponentlal 
o • , 
Xc 
·dlstrlbutlon 1.- + K, where 1<,. Is the maxima! value of the planner's1-, 
Object1ve when .-0. 
PROOF: Denoting, more expliCitly. the pl.nner's abJectlye by W(x;Xo) we h6'le 
by (4.4): 
-\ W( x;xo) = cxo+ :z pn [xn+ 1( 1.pc)l !-f(xn+ 118"01}-0{ 1-~(xnle>Xo)]J 
n=O 
xn+ 1 • 
+ 	J -f(ele >xolde] 
xn .!-, 
I 
! 

I ­
AS 

, 
• 0"0+ I .0 IXn+I{( I+pc)[ H(xn+I-"ols>oll-cl H(xn-"o18>0)] 
n=O 
Xn I-P 
where the lotter equality follows from the fact that Fts exponentially dlstributsd, 
IntrodUCing now the notation x'n' xn - ",,8' =e - Xo aoo wrltlng F(z) Instead of 
I,x'n+ i 8 I
+ J -f(8-XoI8'0)),
, [ 
, 

I 

F(zls, 0) waget: 
W(x;xo)=cxo+ ! pn lx'Ot I+xoJ( 1+Pcll l-F(x' fit 1Jl-C[ H(x' n)>> / 
n=O 
- , 
xn+l 8'+Xo 
t J --(S'lds'] 
x' ­ I-~n 
.. x'n+l $' 
.! POlx'nttl(l+fjc)[H(x'n+IJ]-C[I-F(x'n)]+ f -f(8')<je'] 
n=O x'n 1-, 
- F(x'n+I)-F(x'n) 
+xo(e+! pn(l+fjc)[H(x'o+IJ]-C[H(X'nl]+ ) 
n=O I-P 
1+pc-c 1 .. 
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i 

I 

• W(x;O)+xo{c+ +(-- oJ! PO[pF(x'n+I)-F(X'n)] 

I-P n=-O
I.., 
, t... _ 
=W(x;O)+xo(-+(--C)[~ pn+1 F(x'o+I)- H0F(x'nlJ} 

, I-P I-P n=O n=O 

x 
o 

=W(x'O) + -,
, , 

I-P 

.. .. 
since F(x'o) = Dan<! thus l' pn F(x'0) =:i: po F( X'n)' 
" n=l n=O 
Summarizing. we have shown thet: 
Xo 
W(x:xo) = - + W(x;O), 
I-P 
H() 
But W( x;O) Is bounded by theorem 4 (note thet the hazard ratiO, ,Is a 
tt) 
I 
constant. -) and the lemma Is proven, 
1. 
PROPOSITION 2: The lnvestmeot tlma paths outlined 10(11) and (Ill) of section 
4.C.2. above arGOO,optlmaL 
A. 10 

I!BOOF: 1. We first 'rule out any 1I1vestment path for wh'ch.Vt t ... 
Specializing (S.l ) to the exponenti.l case we hilVe: 
I 1-.-1y . 
Vex) = Max (-oy + - [xl l-.-~Y)+ - ye-"V] 
y~O I-~ ~ 
x 
Weeerteinly hIlVe Vlx) ,- (by settingy = 0) On the other hand, the tafm In 
I-P 
bracason the RHSot(S.S) equals to 
1 I-a-"Y',: 
-r::t + -[x + --- (x+y)e-Ayj+[x+Y+PV(x+ylj.-l.y 
. I-P" . 
x I-o-;l.y 
s-cy+-+ ,pe-1Y k, (5.6)
I-p M1-,) I 
, 
where the IllSt slep follows from lemma B.2 
, 
But the expression on the RHS of (5.6), consililred as 8 function of y only, 
I 
All 
I 
certainly tends to minus Infinity as y tends to infinity. Thus, for sufficiently 
•larlll y the RHS of( 5.6) Is below -.. Furthermore, unOOr' ths postulated 
I-P 
polley. (that Is, one where Yt t .), such y's do eventually emerlll and this 

contradicts the optimality of such policies and .completes the proofof our first , 

essertlOn. 
 I 
2. We now show that Yt • 0 ~tIOI be optimal. For y , 0, \he RHS 01 
(55) exceeds 
, / 
x I~e-~Y 
:= -w+-+ (5.7) 
I-P M I-P) 
x.y 
whsrethslasttermonthaRHSof(S.7) (I.e.,-e-~Y) Is subetltu!ed In for1-, 
I 
i 
I 
ths I.rl/lf term, [x+y+'V(x+y)Je-~Y. Coosicllrlng nf1'll the RHS of (5.7) 3S a 
functton oly, we differentiate it with respect to that voriable which yields 
I I-c+-,O(byA.2)aty-O. Thus, e suffiCiently smallyOOffilnelesy-Oand
I-P 
our second assertion is eslllbilshad as well. 
I 

I
, 
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